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Note
Juveniles Locked in Limbo: Why Pretrial
Detention Implicates a Fundamental Right
Shana Conklin
A fifteen-year-old boy named James allegedly stole a bus
pass, and the police detained him for the offense.1 Despite the
fact that James and his mother attended all his scheduled court
dates, the juvenile court denied his request to be released before his trial.2 For the trivial act of stealing a bus pass, the
court decided to detain him and set his bail at $1500.3 James’s
family could not afford his bail.4
At the age of fifteen, a girl named Maria spent eight weeks
in a juvenile detention center before trial.5 What was her offense? Allegedly, she brought a small metal nail file to school.6
The police found a boy named Kenny with a group of kids
peering into a vandalized car on the street.7 Prosecutors
charged him with receiving stolen property and requested his
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want to thank Professor Perry Moriearty for her thoughtful comments on the
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1. ROBIN L. DAHLBERG, LOCKING UP OUR CHILDREN: THE SECURE DETENTION OF MASSACHUSETTS YOUTH AFTER ARRAIGNMENT AND BEFORE ADJUDICATION 21 (2008), available at http://www.aclu.org/files/pdfs/racialjustice/
locking_up_our_children_web_ma.pdf.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 24.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 22.
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bail be set at $150.8 Unfortunately for Kenny, the court set bail
at $300, twice the amount requested. Unable to pay, Kenny
waited an agonizing five days before trial.9
These cases are not anomalies.10 On any given day, a startling 27,000 juveniles are incarcerated while waiting for their
court dates.11 Pretrial detentions for juveniles have risen since
the 1970s,12 with an astounding seventy-two percent increase
since the 1990s.13 Most of these juveniles either committed
nonviolent, minor offenses or will eventually be acquitted of the
charges.14 Nevertheless, they are kept isolated from their families, friends, and schools until the adjudication of their guilt.15
Juveniles do not have a meaningful opportunity to contest
pretrial detention.16 Juvenile courts have limited procedural
and substantive safeguards in place for juveniles at the pretrial
detention stage.17 Statutes authorizing judges to detain juveniles usually do not provide satisfactory criteria for judges to
use when making the decision to detain a juvenile.18 Often,
8. Id.
9. See id.
10. Carol Rose & Amy Reichbach, Locking Up Our Children, BAY ST.
BANNER, May 15, 2008, available at http://www.baystatebanner.com/Opinion58
-2008-05-15.
11. COAL. FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE, UNLOCKING THE FUTURE: DETENTION
REFORM IN THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM 1 (2003), available at http://www
.juvjustice.org/media/resources/public/resource_114.pdf.
12. Jeffrey Fagan & Martin Guggenheim, Preventative Detention and the
Judicial Prediction of Dangerousness for Juveniles: A Natural Experiment, 86
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 415, 415 (1996).
13. COAL. FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 11.
14. Id. (explaining that in 1999, nearly seventy percent of juveniles in pretrial detention had allegedly committed nonviolent offenses).
15. Id.
16. Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 285–86 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (asserting that in order to make a pretrial detention decision, “each judge
must rely on his own subjective judgment, based on the limited information
available to him at court intake and whatever personal standards he himself
has developed in exercising his discretionary authority under the statute”
(quoting United States ex rel. Martin v. Strasburg, 513 F. Supp. 691, 702
(S.D.N.Y. 1981))).
17. Charles E. Frazier & Donna M. Bishop, The Pretrial Detention of Juveniles and Its Impact on Case Dispositions, 76 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
1132, 1132 (1985) (“Unlike the adjudicatory stage of delinquency case processing, the detention stage traditionally has been unrestrained by either
strict substantive or procedural legal safeguards.”).
18. Id. at 1135; id. at 1151 (“[D]uring the course of this research, juvenile
justice personnel suggested to us that detention criteria are so broad that virtually every child charged with a delinquent act could be said to meet these
criteria.”).
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statutes allow judges to detain juveniles if they believe the juvenile is likely to commit a crime again.19 The inability of juveniles to contest these detentions and the lack of objective criteria in statutes foster arbitrary decisions.20
At the birth of the juvenile court, reformers attempted to
develop a system that melded child welfare concerns with crime
control.21 Despite the founders’ original intentions, however,
the juvenile court system has moved away from the therapeutic
model to a punitive model. The increasingly punitive nature of
the system warrants a second look at the due process safeguards courts afford—or do not afford—juveniles. In In re L.M.,
the Kansas Supreme Court decided, based on the increasingly
punitive nature of the juvenile justice system, that juveniles
should have a constitutional right to a jury trial.22 This decision
analogously provides support for the argument that juveniles
deserve more due process safeguards at the point of pretrial detention. Other jurisdictions have not yet followed this
approach.
This Note argues that courts should recognize that the
ability to contest pretrial detention is a fundamental right, protected by the Due Process Clause of the Constitution. Part I of
this Note discusses the evolution of the juvenile court and the
due process safeguards it affords juveniles. It outlines the seminal cases regarding a juvenile’s right to contest pretrial detention. Part II of this Note critiques the reasoning behind the
placement of so many juveniles in pretrial detention and examines statutes that permit judges to detain juveniles. Finally,
Part III advocates that in light of the increasingly punitive nature of the system, all juveniles should be given greater procedural safeguards including the right to contest pretrial detention. Enacting statutes with specific criteria would give
juveniles a meaningful opportunity to contest pretrial detention.
I. TREAT CHILDREN LIKE CHILDREN: THE BEGINNINGS
OF THE JUVENILE COURT
Prior to the nineteenth century, England and the United
States lumped children older than seven years into the same

19.
20.
21.
22.

Id. at 1135.
See id. at 1132.
DAVID S. TANENHAUS, JUVENILE JUSTICE IN THE MAKING 4 (2004).
186 P.3d 164, 170–72 (Kan. 2008).
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system as adult offenders.23 Juveniles faced the same punishments as adults, including death by hanging and incarceration.24 In the early nineteenth century, Progressive reformers
sought to change the way the justice system treated juveniles.25
Progressives believed that the justice system should treat children differently in light of their vulnerability, innocence, and
dependent nature.26 In particular, the reformers focused on the
idea that children experienced different development stages,
including childhood and adolescence.27 In light of this progressive view of child development, reformers advocated the formation of a juvenile court.28 They wanted the justice system to
recognize that children have a lower level of culpability than
adults.29
Lucy Flowers, “the mother of the juvenile court,”30 developed a system that recognized the principle “that a child should
be treated as a child.”31 The juvenile court relied on the principle of parens patriae.32 This concept supported the notion that
a state should act like a parent when it intervenes in a troubled
youth’s life.33 Whereas the juvenile justice system doled out rehabilitative sentences as punishment, the adult system focused
on punitive measures.34 The juvenile court endeavored to de23. Candace Zierdt, The Little Engine that Arrived at the Wrong Station:
How to Get Juvenile Justice Back on the Right Track, 33 U.S.F. L. REV. 401,
403 (1999); Julie J. Kim, Note, Left Behind: The Paternalistic Treatment of
Status Offenders Within the Juvenile Justice System, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 843,
847 (2010).
24. Zierdt, supra note 23.
25. BARRY C. FELD, CASES AND MATERIALS ON JUVENILE JUSTICE ADMINISTRATION 2 (3d ed. 2009) (“During the early nineteenth century, the social
construction of adolescence as a developmental stage distinct from adulthood
and new sensibilities about children began to pose problems for the criminal
justice system.”).
26. Id. at 3.
27. Id. at 2–3.
28. See id. at 3–4.
29. Id.
30. TANENHAUS, supra note 21 (explaining that social settlement leader
Graham Taylor referred to Lucy Flowers as “the mother of the juvenile court”
because she called for the creation of a juvenile court in 1888).
31. Id. at 23.
32. Id. at 58, 104.
33. FELD, supra note 25, at 4. See generally ANTHONY M. PLATT, THE
CHILD SAVERS: THE INVENTION OF DELINQUENCY xxix (2d ed. 1977) ( providing
useful background information on the Progressive era, including the notion
that “[ p]aternalism was a typical ingredient of most reforms in the Progressive era”).
34. FELD, supra note 25, at 4.
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cide which course of action would be in the best interests of the
offender.35 The rest of Part I discusses the juvenile justice system’s departure from its original rehabilitative principles.
A. DUE PROCESS SAFEGUARDS FOR JUVENILES
When the juvenile court was established, Progressive reformers did not envision the need for due process safeguards.36
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment purports that “[n]o State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”37 The reformers
thought that the rehabilitative purpose of the juvenile court
made the safeguards unnecessary.38 Juvenile courts exercised
discretion over cases in an informal manner.39 Juveniles could
not request a jury or contact a lawyer for assistance.40 In essence, the reformers hoped to distinguish juvenile courts from
the adult criminal courts.41 Therefore, the reformers wished to
equip judges with enough discretion to determine what would
be in the best interests of the young offenders.42 The proceedings were not supposed to mirror the adversarial nature of the
criminal courts; instead, the reformers intended to fashion a
system that was civil in nature.43 Some reasoned that juvenile
proceedings should be considered civil rather than criminal in
nature because unlike adults, juveniles had no rights.44 The
proceedings would simply determine the custody of a child,
which meant that these proceedings would not be subject to the
35. Sacha M. Coupet, Comment, What to Do with the Sheep in Wolf ’s
Clothing: The Role of Rhetoric and Reality About Youth Offenders in the Constructive Dismantling of the Juvenile Justice System, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1303,
1308 (2000).
36. TANENHAUS, supra note 21, at 25, 104; Kim, supra note 23.
37. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
38. Kim, supra note 23.
39. FELD, supra note 25, at 4.
40. Id. (explaining that the courts rejected the need for procedural safeguards prevalent in adult criminal court because the juvenile justice system
focused on rehabilitation, not punishment).
41. See id. (arguing that removing children from the adult criminal court
system would help courts “diagnose the causes of and prescribe the cures for
delinquency”).
42. See id.
43. Kim, supra note 23; see also In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 74 –77 (1967)
(Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that juvenile
proceedings are supposed to be civil, not criminal, in nature). But see Breed v.
Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 529 (1975) (arguing that the Court should “eschew ‘the
‘civil’ label-of-convenience which has been attached to juvenile proceedings’”).
44. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 17.
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same requirements as adult proceedings, when a state restricts
a person’s liberty.45
In 1966, the Supreme Court began to depart from the reformers’ original model for a juvenile court in Kent v. United
States.46 Prior to trial, the juvenile court detained Kent, a fourteen-year-old, for a week and subsequently transferred his case
to adult criminal court without a hearing.47 The Court held that
the juvenile court could not disregard Kent’s statutorily conferred right to have a hearing before waiver into adult court.48
The Court expressed concern with the lack of due process safeguards in juvenile courts.49 The Court asserted “that there may
be grounds for concern that the child receives the worst of both
worlds: that he gets neither the protections accorded to adults
nor the solicitous care and regenerative treatment postulated
for children.”50
Shortly after Kent, the Court granted juveniles several due
process safeguards in In re Gault.51 A lower court judge sentenced Gault, a fifteen-year-old boy, to incarceration for six
years for making a prank phone call52 and acting in a habitually immoral way.53 The Court explained that absent adequate
legal counsel, juveniles are at a substantial disadvantage in the
courtroom.54 When a juvenile faces incarceration, he is “subjected to the loss of his liberty for years” which “is comparable
in seriousness to a felony prosecution.”55 The Court recognized
that neither the judge nor the probation officer may act as a
representative for a juvenile delinquent and that the presence
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Id.
383 U.S. 541 (1966); Kim, supra note 23, at 852.
Kent, 383 U.S. at 543–49.
Id. at 557.
Id.; see also MICHAEL D. GRIMES, PATCHING UP THE CRACKS: A CASE
STUDY OF JUVENILE COURT REFORM 10 (2005) (“Thus, what seemed to progressive reformers to be a better way to address the unique needs of children
in a more informal and individualized way would later be seen as a system
that denied children their rights to due process.”).
50. Kent, 383 U.S. at 556.
51. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
52. Id. at 29. One author characterized Gault’s sentence as “an extreme
miscarriage[ ] of justice.” David N. Sandberg, Resolving the Gault Dilemma, 48
N.H. B.J. 58, 58 (2007).
53. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 9. The judge defended his ruling that Gault
acted in a habitually immoral way by explaining that Gault had stolen a baseball mitt at the age of thirteen and subsequently lied to the police about it.
Sandberg, supra note 52, at 59, 66 n.15.
54. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 36–37.
55. Id. at 36.
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of an attorney for a child in such a complex system is critical to
make certain due process is carried out.56
In re Gault is a seminal case because it secured a number
of due process safeguards for juveniles for the first time.57 Specifically, the Court held that juveniles have (1) the right to
counsel,58 (2) the right to adequate notice of a hearing,59 (3) the
right to written notice to a parent or guardian,60 and (4) the
right against self-incrimination.61 When a juvenile faces
lengthy incarceration, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment ensures that the individual receives “fair
treatment.”62 The Court’s recognition of these due process safeguards significantly changed the juvenile justice system.63
The In re Gault decision marked a substantial departure
from the reformers’ original vision of the juvenile court.64 Some
worried that granting juveniles due process rights would blur
the line between the criminal court and juvenile court and
would detract from juvenile court’s rehabilitative underpinnings.65 Whereas Justice Abe Fortas believed the due process
safeguards would not alter the basic structure of the juvenile
court, Justice Potter Stewart worried that In re Gault “sounded
the death knell for the juvenile court.”66 Justice Fortas asserted
that the juvenile court could retain its unique features if the

56. See id.
57. Sandberg, supra note 52.
58. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 36.
59. Id. at 33.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 47 (“It would indeed be surprising if the privilege against selfincrimination were available to hardened criminals but not to children.”).
62. Id. at 30. Justice Black took a different stance in his concurrence, arguing that if a court denies these rights to a juvenile, it would constitute “invidious discrimination” and violate the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 61 (Black, J., concurring).
63. Sandberg, supra note 52.
64. See Michele Benedetto Neitz, A Unique Bench, a Common Code: Evaluating Judicial Ethics in Juvenile Court, 24 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 97, 102
(2011); Sandberg, supra note 52.
65. Sandberg, supra note 52; see also Martin Guggenheim & Randy Hertz,
Reflections on Judges, Juries, and Justice: Ensuring the Fairness of Juvenile
Delinquency Trials, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 553, 560–62 (1998) (noting the
Court’s hesitancy to grant additional due process safeguards to juveniles rested in the belief that it would ruin the traditional juvenile court model).
66. Neitz, supra note 64, at 103 (“The [Gault] Court acknowledged the
unique benefits of the juvenile system, but believed that the imposition of due
process standards would not disrupt such benefits.”); Sandberg, supra note 52.
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new due process procedures were “intelligently and not ruthlessly administered.”67
A few years later, the Court determined that the Due Process Clause entitles juveniles to the application of a beyond a
reasonable-doubt standard of proof for a criminal conviction.68
Without the reasonable-doubt standard, the Court stated juveniles would be subjected to a “disadvantage amounting to a
lack of fundamental fairness.”69 In the context of juvenile justice, the Court held that the relevant inquiry is whether the
procedural safeguards are “necessary to guarantee the fundamental fairness of juvenile proceedings.”70
After initially recognizing that juveniles have several due
process rights, the Court became reluctant to extend any more
due process protections.71 In 1971, the Court in McKeiver v.
Pennsylvania cautioned against providing juveniles with additional due process safeguards.72 The McKeiver Court did not
want to provide juveniles with juries because it worried that juries would prejudge the juveniles.73 The Court believed that juries, unlike judges with special expertise, would not take social
and psychological factors into account.74 The use of juries, the
Court thought, would ruin the juvenile court’s rehabilitative
mission.75
The majority in McKeiver applied the fundamental fairness
due process standard.76 The Court inquired whether the right
to trial by jury is a “necessary component of accurate

61.

67. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 21 (1967); see also Sandberg, supra note 52, at

68. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 368 (1970).
69. Id. at 363.
70. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 74 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
71. Jay D. Blitzman, Gault’s Promise, 9 BARRY L. REV. 67, 76 (2007) (“[A]
mere four years later McKeiver held that juveniles were not entitled to the
panoply of due process rights that adults have in criminal proceedings.”); Perry L. Moriearty, Combating the Color-Coded Confinement of Kids: An Equal
Protection Remedy, 32 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 285, 296 (2008) (“[The
Court] has expressly refused to grant juveniles all of the procedural rights afforded adults.”).
72. 403 U.S. 528, 545–50 (1971).
73. But see id. at 568–69 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (arguing that juries
would provide juveniles a chance not to be judged on their backgrounds).
74. But see id.
75. See id.
76. Id. at 543 ( plurality opinion).
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factfinding.”77 The majority held that jury trials are not the only way to engage in a fact-finding mission.78 Finally, it worried
that requiring jury trials would disrupt the states’ ability to experiment with methods to help young offenders.79
In summary, the Supreme Court provided juveniles with
some due process safeguards but, as time went on, became reluctant to provide any more.80 Juvenile courts became “quasicriminal” in nature because they offered some rights and safeguards, but not others.81 These courts struggled with their original rehabilitative foundation and the State’s purported interest of controlling crime.82
B. THE MOVE TOWARDS A PUNITIVE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM
In the mid-1980s and early 1990s, juvenile crime spiked.83
In response, state legislatures passed “get tough on crime”
laws.84 Public outcry against rising juvenile crime led fortyseven states and the District of Columbia to enact laws aimed
at juveniles who commit serious and violent crimes.85 The punitive nature of the juvenile justice system is evidenced by substantive changes in five areas of the law: (1) facilitating the
transfer of juveniles to the adult criminal justice system; (2)
expanding sentencing options to include punitive measures; (3)
77. Id.; see also Guggenheim & Hertz, supra note 65, at 562 (“[A] critical
premise of the Court’s analysis in McKeiver was that judges can be as fair as
juries in deciding cases.”).
78. McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 543.
79. Moriearty, supra note 71.
80. See, e.g., McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 545 (denying that a jury trial in juvenile courts is a constitutional requirement).
81. Moriearty, supra note 71, at 287.
82. See LARRY J. SIEGEL & BRANDON C. WELSH, JUVENILE DELINQUENCY:
THEORY, PRACTICE, AND LAW 446 (10th ed. 2009).
83. Connie M. Tang et al., Effects of Trial Venue and Pretrial Bias on the
Evaluation of Juvenile Defendants, 34 CRIM. JUST. REV. 210, 210 (2009).
84. Id.; Christine D. Ely, Note, A Criminal Education: Arguing for Adequacy in Adult Correctional Facilities, 39 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 795, 798
(2008).
85. Sara Sun Beale, The News Media’s Influence on Criminal Justice Policy, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 397, 407 (2006); Tang et al., supra note 83. For example, in Michigan, the legislature lowered the age at which a juvenile could
be waived into adult court from fifteen to fourteen. Robert E. Shepherd, Jr.,
Sentencing a Child for Murder in a “Get Tough” Era, CRIM. JUST., Spring
2000, at 70, 71. In Minnesota, the legislature attempted to lower the age from
fourteen to thirteen. Bob Collins, Should More Juveniles Be Charged as
Adults?, MINN. PUB. RADIO (Mar. 13, 2008, 11:55 AM), http://minnesota
.publicradio.org/collections/special/columns/news_cut/archive/2008/03/should_
more_juveniles_be_charg.shtml.
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reducing or removing confidentiality; (4) focusing on victims’
rights; and (5) correctional programming.86
From 1992 to 1995, forty states adopted laws making it
easier for juvenile delinquents to be charged, tried, and convicted in adult criminal court.87 Many state legislatures
amended their juvenile codes’ purpose clause to include punitive language, marking a departure from their previously rehabilitative focus.88 Many states enacted statutes for mandatoryminimum and determinate sentencing and reduced the confidentiality with court records juveniles enjoyed under the old
statutes.89 Thirty-one state legislatures increased options for
sentencing juveniles, and all but three states eliminated confidentiality protections, enabling public access to juvenile proceedings and records.90 Research indicates that from 1988 to
1992, discretionary judicial transfers of juvenile to adult court
increased by sixty-eight percent.91
In addition to state legislatures passing “get tough” legislation, Congress passed similar laws to transform the juvenile
court into a punitive institution, departing from its rehabilitative roots.92 In the 1990s, Congress amended the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974 to create a more
punitive system.93 The reluctance of the courts to implement
more due process safeguards combined with increasingly punitive legislation marked a departure from the juvenile court’s
original rehabilitative mission.

86. RICHARD LAWRENCE & MARIO HESSE, JUVENILE JUSTICE 21–22
(2010).
87. Beale, supra note 85; see also Ely, supra note 84, at 798–99 (detailing
the types of laws adopted in that timeframe).
88. Moriearty, supra note 71, at 297.
89. Id.
90. Courtney P. Fain, Note, What’s in a Name? The Worrisome Interchange of Juvenile “Adjudications” with Criminal “Convictions,” 49 B.C. L.
REV. 495, 504 (2008).
91. Richard E. Redding, Juveniles Transferred to Criminal Court: Legal
Reform Proposals Based on Social Science Research, 1997 UTAH L. REV. 709,
715.
92. See Kelly M. Angell, Note, The Regressive Movement: When Juvenile
Offenders are Treated as Adults, Nobody Wins, 14 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 125,
130 (2004).
93. Id.
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In Ohio, a recent class action lawsuit prompted a thorough
investigation of its juvenile detention facilities.94 The majority
of the Ohio Department of Youth Services facilities were “overcrowded, understaffed, and underserved in such vital areas as
safety, education, mental health treatment and rehabilitative
programming.”95 The independent investigators discovered
that:
Excessive force and the excessive use of isolation, some of it extraordinarily prolonged, is endemic to the ODYS system.
Juvenile Correctional Officers (JCOs) bitterly complained about
the excessive use of mandated overtime, a practice at least partly
driven by understaffing . . . . JCOs function now more like prison
guards (or police officers) than trained partners in a shared rehabilitative effort.96

A mere twenty-one percent of juveniles in detention facilities are charged with serious, violent crimes.97 One chief probation officer succinctly explained, “These are kids we are angry
at, not kids we are scared of.”98 Whereas the juvenile court system used to focus on the social welfare of the children, it has
now become a “second-class criminal court for young people.”99
C. THE ABILITY OF A JUVENILE TO CONTEST PRETRIAL
DETENTION
In light of the punitive legislation passed, juveniles lack
sufficient due process safeguards to contest pretrial detention.
Preventative detention was historically used as a tool in adult
criminal court to detain defendants, but its use has been extended to juvenile court.100 Courts traditionally detained juveniles prior to trial only to ensure that the youth attended all future court dates.101 This Note considers the precedent,
purposes, and interests implicated in order to understand the

94. FRED COHEN, FINAL FACT-FINDING REPORT: S.H. V. STICKRATH, i
(2008), available at http://www.dys.ohio.gov/DNN/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=
lDovnn7P96A%3D&tabid=81&mid=394.
95. Id.
96. Id. at ii.
97. THE ANNIE E. CASEY FOUND., TWO DECADES OF JDAI: A PROGRESS
REPORT FROM DEMONSTRATION PROJECT TO NATIONAL STANDARD 7 (2009).
98. Id.
99. Barry C. Feld, Abolish the Juvenile Court: Youthfulness, Criminal Responsibility, and Sentencing Policy, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 68, 68
(1997).
100. See Moriearty, supra note 71, at 299.
101. Id. at 303.
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deprivation of due process involved when a juvenile is detained
prior to adjudication.
Before the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Schall v.
Martin, the Second Circuit heard the case.102 The critical issue
centered on juvenile pretrial detention rights.103 The New York
Family Court Act allowed a juvenile offender to be detained if
the judge found “that there is a ‘serious risk’ that the child ‘may
before the return date commit an act which if committed by an
adult would constitute a crime.’”104 Although the Supreme
Court later reversed the decision, the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals held that the provision was “unconstitutional as to all
juveniles” because the statute is administered in such a way
that “the detention period serves as punishment imposed without proof of guilt established according to the requisite constitutional standard.”105 The statute allowed juvenile courts to
place presumptively innocent offenders in detention.106 It enabled judges to detain juveniles without holding a probable
cause hearing at their initial appearance.107
Regardless of the Second Circuit’s ruling, the Schall Court
authorized preventative detention based on the future dangerousness of the offender.108 The Court applied the fundamentalfairness due process standard and found that preventative detention statute in question did not violate due process because
it served a legitimate regulatory purpose.109 The Schall opinion
contended that pretrial detention of juveniles serves a legitimate governmental interest of protecting society and the offender from the “potential consequences of his criminal acts.”110

102. Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 254 (1984).
103. See id. at 255–57.
104. Id. at 255 (quoting N.Y. JUD. LAW § 320.5(3)( b) (McKinney 1983)).
105. Martin v. Strasburg, 689 F.2d 365, 373, 374 (2d Cir. 1982), rev’d sub
nom. Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253 (1984).
106. Id. at 372–74.
107. See id. at 369–70; Corey Steinberg, Note, “Justice Delayed is Justice
Denied”: The Abuse of Pre-Arraignment Delay, 9 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 403,
415 (1992) (summarizing the holding in Strasburg).
108. Schall, 467 U.S. at 278 (“[F ]rom a legal point of view there is nothing
inherently unattainable about a prediction of future criminal conduct.”); see
Meghan Shapiro, An Overdose of Dangerousness: How “Future Dangerousness”
Catches the Least Culpable Capital Defendants and Undermines the Rational
for the Executions it Supports, 35 AM. J. CRIM. L. 145, 165 (2008).
109. Schall, 467 U.S. at 268, 274.
110. Id. at 264 (citation omitted).
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Additionally, preventative detention helped the government
avoid the “serious risk”111 to public safety the juvenile poses.112
The Court based its holding in part on parens patriae.113
Juveniles, presumably, are constantly under adult supervision
and control.114 The Court equated state custody with being in
the custody of a parent.115 Thus, the Court reasoned that when
juveniles commit crimes, it means that their parents failed to
properly supervise them.116 The State is simply temporarily
taking over the parenting role.117 In the eyes of the Court, the
State must step in and detain the juvenile to “preserv[e] and
promot[e] the welfare of the child.”118
Ultimately, the Court held that the governmental interest
in detaining juveniles outweighs the deprivation of a juvenile’s
liberty interest.119 Since Schall, states have broadened their
statutes to enable courts to detain juveniles on the basis of a
multitude of other factors.120 Notably, during the ten years following the Schall decision, detention of juveniles has risen by
seventy-two percent.121
This Note addresses the implication that a juvenile’s liberty interest amounts to something less than a fundamental
right. As the juvenile justice system becomes increasingly punitive, courts’ analyses of due process challenges have largely
remained the same. Given the sharply punitive nature of the
system, the Supreme Court should revisit past decisions and
reconsider its current legal standard. Part II analyzes the flaws
111. Id. at 278.
112. Bernard P. Perlmutter, “Unchain the Children”: Gault, Therapeutic
Jurisprudence, and Shackling, 9 BARRY L. REV. 1, 42 (2007).
113. Schall, 467 U.S. at 265 (“But that interest must be qualified by the
recognition that juveniles, unlike adults, are always in some form of custody.”).
114. See id. (“They are assumed to be subject to the control of their parents,
and if parental control falters, the State must play its part as parens
patriae.”).
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 266 (asserting that the State should take a parental role to protect the juvenile from any further consequences of his “criminal activity”).
118. Id. at 265 (citation omitted); Adam Klein & Benjamin Wittes, Preventive Detention in American Theory and Practice, 2 HARV. NAT’L SECURITY J.
85, 131 (2011) (noting that the Schall Court held that juveniles have only a
“‘qualified’ liberty interest [ because] unlike adults, [they are] ‘always in some
form of custody’” (quoting Schall, 467 U.S. at 265)).
119. See Moriearty, supra note 71.
120. Id. at 303 (including factors such as future dangerousness and adequate supervision and care).
121. Id.
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in precedent and statutes pertaining to the pretrial detention of
juveniles. It demonstrates that juveniles facing pretrial detention lack adequate due process safeguards.
II. AN EXAMINATION OF STATUTES AND PRECEDENT:
THE LACK OF FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS IN THE
JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM
This Part examines Schall v. Martin and its deleterious
impact on the juvenile justice system. First, this Part assesses
the gravity of a juvenile’s liberty interest to be free from physical restraint. Second, this Part examines the stigmatization of
juveniles who are detained prior to trial. Finally, this Part critiques the current statutory framework pertaining to the preventative detention of juveniles. It argues that the criteria
listed in the current statutes lead to arbitrary and capricious
judicial decision making and due process violations.
A. REVISITING SCHALL V. MARTIN
The Supreme Court decided Schall in 1984122—before the
“get tough on crime” era and the spike in juvenile crime in the
1990s.123 This Section reexamines the Schall decision in light of
the changes that resulted from new legislation. In addition, it
urges the reconsideration of the use of parens patriae given the
legislature’s departure from the rehabilitative model for the juvenile court system. The legal and political climates have substantially changed following the spike in juvenile crime in the
1990s.124 In order to ensure the system offers juveniles adequate due process protection, the reasoning behind Schall must
be reexamined.
1. Reconsidering the Magnitude of a Juvenile’s Liberty
Interest
In order to determine whether a fundamental right is at issue in a Due Process challenge, a court must first identify the
right in question.125 The Supreme Court has explained that
“[t]he Due Process Clause guarantees more than fair process,
and the liberty it protects includes more than the absence of

122.
123.
124.
125.

Schall, 467 U.S. at 253.
Tang et al., supra note 83.
Id.
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720–21 (1997).
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physical restraint.”126 One methodology protects those rights
which are “objectively, ‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history
and tradition . . . .’”127 Fundamental rights are those which are
“‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,’ such that ‘neither
liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed.’”128 The
Court has consistently held that Due Process includes the right
to be free from physical restraint.129 When a fundamental right
is implicated, the Court applies strict scrutiny.130 Under strict
scrutiny, the government must have a compelling interest and
its means of regulation must be narrowly tailored to that
interest.131
The Schall Court recognized that juveniles have a “substantial”—rather than “fundamental”—interest to be free from
physical restraint.132 The Court downplayed the interest by relying on the idea that children are always in some form of custody.133 Children have a diminished liberty interest because the
doctrine of parens patriae supports the idea that the State
should take a parental role if necessary.134 The post-Schall juvenile justice system’s emphasis on the individualized treatment for each juvenile enables judges to exercise a great degree
of control over juvenile offenders’ lives.135
Following the “get tough on crime” legislation in the 1990s,
the juvenile justice system has lost sight of the principle of

126. Id. at 719 (internal quotation marks omitted).
127. Id. at 720–21 (quoting Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503
(1977)).
128. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S.
319, 325, 326 (1937)); see also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 500
(1965) (Harlan, J., concurring) (relying on similar language).
129. Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1,
18 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673–74 (1977)).
130. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973) (“Where certain ‘fundamental
rights’ are involved . . . regulation limiting these rights may be justified only
by a ‘compelling state interest,’ . . . and legislative enactments must be narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate state interests at stake.” (citations
omitted)).
131. Id.
132. Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 265 (1984).
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 264; see also Michael H. Langley, The Juvenile Court: The Making of a Delinquent, 7 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 273, 274 (1972) ( pointing out that juvenile courts “establish value priorities” to help guide each juvenile through
the system).
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parens patriae.136 Yet continued reliance on the principle of
parens patriae gives a great deal of discretion to judges over a
multitude of decisions, including the decision to detain a juvenile pending trial.137 The original justification for giving judges
discretion over juvenile detention was to facilitate the rehabilitative process for juvenile offenders.138 Judges, however, have
been using pretrial detention as a teaching tool without regard
to the detrimental consequences youth face.139 Since the system
has become more punitive, the justification for judicial discretion is no longer applicable. Regardless of the severity of the offense, the strength of the evidence, or the sentence the juvenile
faces after the trial, the judge remains free to detain the
offender.140
In addition, courts should abandon the parens patriae
principle because the detainment of a juvenile in a state institution is not comparable to the control a parent exerts over a
child.141 Parental custody is markedly different from state incarceration.142 The majority opinion in In re Gault emphasizes
the distinct differences between state incarceration and parental custody:
The fact of the matter is that, however euphemistic the title, a receiving home or an industrial school for juveniles is an institution of confinement in which the child is incarcerated for a greater or lesser
time. His world becomes a building with whitewashed walls, regimented routine and institutional hours . . . . Instead of mother and father and sisters and brothers and friends and classmates, his world is
peopled by guards, custodians, state employees, and delinquents confined with him for anything from waywardness to rape and homicide.143

The differences between parental and state custody highlighted
in the In re Gault opinion should not be ignored.
136. Janet E. Ainsworth, Re-Imagining Childhood and Reconstructing the
Legal Order: The Case for Abolishing the Juvenile Court, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1083,
1120 (1991) (“[T]he paternalistic tendencies that juvenile court engenders in
its functionaries undermines the norm of litigant process control . . . . All of
these divergences from procedural justice norms strongly suggest that, in the
eyes of juvenile respondents, the legitimacy of juvenile court is suspect.”);
Tang et al., supra note 83.
137. TANENHAUS, supra note 21, at 58, 104.
138. Charles E. Frazier & Donna M. Bishop, The Pretrial Detention of Juveniles and Its Impact on Case Dispositions, 76 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
1133 (1985).
139. DAHLBERG, supra note 1, at 8.
140. Frazier & Bishop, supra note 138, at 1135.
141. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 27 (1967).
142. Id.
143. Id. (citations omitted).
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The secure juvenile detention facilities at issue in Schall
“subjected [juveniles] to strip-searches,” forced them to wear
“institutional clothing,” and demanded that they abide by an
“institutional regimen.”144 Juveniles could also be placed in
nonsecure facilities, which were comparable to halfway houses
for adults.145 At the time the Court decided Schall, courts
placed roughly six times as many juveniles in secure-detention
facilities as into nonsecure facilities.146 The nature of the juvenile detention centers support the proposition that state custody is distinct from parental custody.
Juveniles should enjoy a fundamental right to be free from
physical restraint, not merely a “substantial interest.”
2. Pretrial Detention is a Punitive Measure that Stigmatizes
Presumptively Innocent Juveniles
Pretrial detention has a profound impact upon children.
The use of pretrial detention as a punishment tool ostracizes
presumptively innocent children. Separating children from
their communities and removing them from their schools has
harsh and deleterious effects.
The use of pretrial detention as punishment violates the
principle of fairness enshrined in the Due Process Clause.
Schall explained that to avoid violation of the Due Process
Clause “a pretrial detainee [can]not be punished.”147 However,
the majority regarded the pretrial detention of juveniles as a
legitimate regulatory measure that, absent an express intent to
punish, did not rise to the level of unconstitutionality.148 The
Schall Court did not consider that the removal of a juvenile
from his or her family results in the isolation of children from
their communities and families.
Justice Thurgood Marshall quoted the experienced family
court judge in the case to describe the true nature of juvenile
pretrial detention:
Then again, Juvenile Center, as much as we might try, is not the
most pleasant place in the world. If you put them in detention, you
are liable to be exposing these youngsters to all sorts of things. They
are liable to be exposed to assault, they are liable to be exposed to
sexual assaults. You are taking the risk of putting them together with
144. Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 287–88 (1984) (quoting United States
ex rel. Martin v. Strasburg, 513 F. Supp. 691, 695 n.5 (1981)).
145. Id. at 271.
146. Id. at 287 n.10.
147. Id. at 269 (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 n.16 (1979)).
148. Id.
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a youngster that might be much worse than they, possibly might be,
and it might have a bad effect in that respect.149

The overuse of pretrial detention of juveniles presents serious legal, sociological, and economic consequences.150 Pretrial
detention should not be viewed as a therapeutic measure.151 A
recent report found that in Massachusetts, at least one in
twelve detained youth experience a serious incident, which includes peer-on-peer conflict, threatening or disruptive conduct,
or suicidal tendencies.152 The average stay of each juvenile is a
lengthy sixteen days in Massachusetts.153 In addition to the
impact detention has on juveniles, the taxpayer bears the brunt
of the economic consequence of pretrial detention. Detaining
just one juvenile costs Massachusetts taxpayers a hefty
$15,000.154
The separation of a juvenile from his or her family prior to
trial has detrimental effects on the youth.155 The complete separation of a juvenile from his or her community, home, school,
and life is a substantial burden.156 One author explains that,
“[e]ven juveniles who remain housed with other juveniles can
suffer permanent and debilitating harm just by virtue of being
incarcerated.”157 Separating juveniles from their families represents another reason why the pretrial detention of juveniles is
a punitive decision.158
Stigmatizing juveniles is contrary to the concept of parens
patriae. The objective of parens patriae can be viewed as twofold.159 First, the principle helps to legitimize the State’s inter-

149. Id. at 290 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
150. See id. at 291 (“Such serious injuries to presumptively innocent persons—encompassing the curtailment of their constitutional rights to liberty—
can be justified only by a weighty public interest that is substantially advanced by the statute.”); Barry C. Feld, The Right to Counsel in Juvenile
Court: An Empirical Study of When Lawyers Appear and the Difference They
Make, 79 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1185, 1337 (1989) (“The overuse and
abuse of pretrial detention is a recurrent theme in juvenile justice.”).
151. See Schall, 467 U.S. at 290 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“The majority’s . . . characterization of preventative detention . . . is difficult to take
seriously.”).
152. DAHLBERG, supra note 1, at 7.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. See Angell, supra note 92, at 142.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. See id. at 142–43 (discussing the stigmatization of detention).
159. Langley, supra note 135, at 281.
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vention into the youth’s life.160 Second, the protective, caring
role of the judge attempts to minimize the criminal stigmatization of juvenile offenders.161 Nonetheless, in today’s punitive
system, incarceration, even if only for a week, has the effect of
labeling the juvenile as an offender.162 It stigmatizes the juvenile and alienates him or her from the community.163 Attaching
stigma to an alleged juvenile offender does not serve the system’s rehabilitative purpose or the purported objective of
parens patriae.164
In addition to the sociological effects, the pretrial detention
of juveniles has serious legal consequences. Numerous empirical studies have shown that the pretrial-detainment decision
substantially influences the juvenile court judge’s ruling later in
the case.165 In fact, the pretrial detention decision constitutes the
“second most important determinate” in subsequent sentencing
decisions to remove juveniles from their homes.166 The imprisonment of young offenders leads to higher rates of recidivism.167
Juveniles cannot easily get rid of the stigma that even
temporary incarceration brings.168 Taking punitive measures to
deal with juvenile crime may have the effect of turning youth
into hardened criminals.169 The stigma may cause the juveniles
to believe they are delinquents and to start acting that way.170
Simply put, the incarceration of juveniles prior to adjudication
has serious, lasting effects, and the deleterious effects of deten160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Andrew Walkover, The Infancy Defense in Juvenile Court, 31 UCLA L.
REV. 503, 527 (1984) (“Concluding that contact with the juvenile court is a key
event in the creation of further deviant behavior, labeling theorists urged a
broad prohibition against unwarranted and potentially counterproductive juvenile court intervention into the lives of children experiencing deviant
episodes.”).
163. Langley, supra note 135, at 278.
164. See id. at 281 ( listing the objectives of parens patriae).
165. Feld, supra note 150, at 1337–38.
166. Id. at 1338.
167. Ethel Reyes Hernandez, In Re L.M.: Following Kansas Down the Path
to Juvenile Justice, 35 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 257, 271–72 (2010); see also Angell, supra note 92, at 142 (“In addition, when ‘ties to the conventional community are broken[, i]nmate groups provide subcultural support for crime,’
which further encourages recidivism.” (quoting Donna M. Bishop et al., Juvenile Justice Under Attack: An Analysis of the Causes and Impact of Recent Reforms, 10 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 129, 152 (1998))).
168. Angell, supra note 92, at 142.
169. Hernandez, supra note 167; Angell, supra note 92, at 126–27.
170. Angell, supra note 92, at 142.
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tion call for greater due process safeguards.
3. The Denigration of Parens Patriae in State Legislation
The Schall Court based its decision largely on the principle
of parens patriae.171 A 2003 survey revealed that a mere nine
states continue to use language from the Standard Juvenile
Court Act, which is based on the principle of parens patriae.172
The purpose of the Standard Juvenile Court Act was that:
[E]ach child coming within the jurisdiction of the court shall receive . . . the care, guidance, and control that will conduce to his welfare . . . and . . . when he is removed from the control of his parents
the court shall secure for him care as nearly as possible equivalent to
that which they should have given him.173

Only three states and the District of Columbia use language in statutes to explain the sole or primary purpose of the
juvenile justice system is to promote the best interests and welfare of the juveniles.174 For instance, Massachusetts requires
that accused juveniles be “treated, not as criminals, but as children in need of aid, encouragement and guidance.”175 West Virginia declares that it intends to implement “all reasonable
means and methods that can be established by a humane and
enlightened state, solicitous of the welfare of its children, for
the prevention of delinquency and for the care and rehabilitation of juvenile delinquents . . . .”176 Conversely, a number of
states now cite “punishment and/or offender accountability” as
a goal.177 The policy differences highlight the fact that juvenile
justice system has effectively moved away from the original rehabilitative foundation.178 In light of the denigration of parens
patriae, Schall must be reconsidered.
4. The Doctrine of Stare Decisis Does Not Prevent the
Reversal of Schall
The Supreme Court noted in Lawrence v. Texas that “[t]he
doctrine of stare decisis . . . is not . . . an inexorable command.”179 The Lawrence Court cautioned overruling decisions
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 265 (1984).
Angell, supra note 92, at 131.
Id. at 131 n.48.
Id. at 131.
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 119, § 53 (LexisNexis 2009).
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 49-5B-2 (LexisNexis 2009).
Angell, supra note 92, at 131.
Id.
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577 (2003).
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which recognized a constitutional liberty interest that resulted
in “individual or societal reliance” on such a liberty.180 Schall
did not induce the sort of detrimental individual or societal reliance that could justify upholding the decision.181 On the contrary, reversal would alleviate the hardship on juveniles who
are facing the detrimental consequences of pretrial detention.
Since Schall, the juvenile justice system has become increasingly
punitive, straying from its rehabilitative mission.182 Overruling
the decision would offer much-needed protection to juveniles.
The Lawrence Court overturned Bowers v. Hardwick due to
Bowers’s erroneous holding that the Due Process Clause did not
encompass the liberty interest to engage in consensual, intimate relations.183 The same reasoning should apply in Schall.
The Schall Court failed to recognize that juveniles have a fundamental constitutional right under the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.184 The Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment endeavors to protect, not oppress, individuals.185 As such, the doctrine of stare decisis cannot justify
the deprivation of constitutional rights, and it should not prevent the Court from overruling Schall to protect minors in the
juvenile justice system.
B. BROAD STATUTES LEAD TO THE OVERUSE OF PRETRIAL
DETENTION AND DEGRADE DUE PROCESS PROTECTIONS
As mentioned previously, the shift of the juvenile justice
180. Id. (citing Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 855–
56 (1992)).
181. See, e.g., id. at 577–78 (overruling Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186
(1986), in part because it did not induce detrimental reliance); Planned
Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854 (upholding Roe v. Wade because that decision induced “reliance that would lend a special hardship to the
consequences of overruling and add inequity to the cost of repudiation”).
182. For a discussion of the increasingly punitive juvenile justice system,
see supra Part I.B.
183. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 (overruling Bowers in part because it
“was not correct when it was decided, and it is not correct today”).
184. See Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 265 (1984) (defining the right as
substantial rather than fundamental).
185. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578–79 (“Had those who drew and ratified
the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment known the components of liberty in its manifold possibilities, they might
have been more specific. They did not presume to have this insight. They knew
times can blind us to certain truths and later generations can see that laws
once thought necessary and proper in fact serve only to oppress. As the Constitution endures, persons in every generation can invoke its principles in their
own search for greater freedom.”).
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system from rehabilitation to punitive punishment is reflected
in the passage of the “get tough on crime” legislation in the
1990s.186 The seventy-two percent increase in the pretrial detention of juveniles from 1985 to 1995187 lends credence to the
idea that the juvenile justice system has become more punitive
in nature.188 The change in the political climate is mirrored by
the change in the legal system.189
Vague statutes grant the judiciary a wealth of discretion
over the fate of juveniles facing pretrial detention.190 For example, the relevant Ohio statute provides a number of ways for
the court to legally detain a juvenile, including “an order for
placement of the child in detention or shelter care . . . made by
the court.”191 The statute itself does not specify the criteria on
which a judge should base that determination.192 The Ohio
statute enables courts to detain juveniles prior to trial for reasons that have nothing to do with unlawful conduct. The following language in the statute substantiates this assertion:
A child taken into custody shall not be confined . . . unless detention
or shelter care is required to protect the child from immediate or
threatened physical or emotional harm . . . because the child has no
parents, guardian, or custodian or other person able to provide supervision and care for the child and return the child to the court when
required . . . .193

186. Ely, supra note 84.
187. Moriearty, supra note 71, at 303.
188. See Sean E. Smith, Sealing Up the Problem of California’s “One Strike
and You’re Out” Approach for Serious Juvenile Offenders, 32 T. JEFFERSON L.
REV. 339, 352–53 (2010) (asserting that many states moved away from the rehabilitative model for juvenile courts).
189. See id. at 349 (explaining that politicians used “tough on crime” campaigns to win elections while legal scholars focused on how the rehabilitative
goals of the juvenile justice system had failed).
190. See Feld, supra note 150, at 1338 (“Detention constitutes a highly arbitrary and capricious process of short-term confinement with no tenable or
objective rationale. Once it occurs, however, it then increases the likelihood of
additional post-adjudication sanctions as well. In operation, detention almost
randomly imposes punishment on some juveniles for no obvious reason and
then punishes them again for having been punished before.”); Kim, supra note
23, at 857 (“The denial of these and other rights is especially troubling because
the legal criteria for certain status offenses are very vague. The lack of clarity in
these statutes allows for a great deal of discretion for juvenile court judges.”).
191. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.31(C)(1) (LexisNexis 2011); see also
Claudia Worrell, Note, Pretrial Detention of Juveniles: Denial of Equal Protection Masked by the Parens Patriae Doctrine, 95 YALE L.J. 174, 176 n.13 (1985)
( listing various child-detention statutes).
192. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.31.
193. Id. § 2151.31(C)(1); see also Worrell, supra note 191.
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Not surprisingly, in 2006, forty-five percent of the 5438 juvenile offenders in detainment in Massachusetts had been
charged with misdemeanors.194 Following pretrial detainment,
at least eighty percent of the alleged offenders returned home
after the disposition of their cases.195 No public documents
substantiated a claim that the detained children had failed to
appear for court dates or that they posed a danger to the
community.196
The reliance on the idea that a juvenile may be dangerous
in the future leads to the overuse of pretrial detention.197 Although the Supreme Court acknowledges the presumption of innocence,198 it validates the use of the imprecise factor of the
probability that the alleged offender will recidivate.199 With no
way to accurately quantify a presumptively innocent juvenile’s
tendency to commit future crimes, courts make arbitrary determinations.200
The statute in question in Schall allowed judges to place
juveniles in pretrial detention prior to holding a fact-finding
hearing to determine whether the juvenile posed a risk to society.201 In fact, the statute allowed juveniles to remain in detention for five days before holding the probable cause hearing.202
This five-day waiting period constituted a punitive measure
which stigmatizes the alleged offender and amounts to a lack of
fundamental fairness.203
Broad statutes facilitate the overuse of pretrial detention
and denigrate the few due process protections juveniles retain
during the pretrial detention phase. Statutes should employ
the use of specific criteria to avoid giving the judiciary excessive discretion.

194. DAHLBERG, supra note 1, at 6.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Shapiro, supra note 108.
198. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363 (1970).
199. Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 278 (1984).
200. Id. (discussing the concern that courts cannot accurately predict future behavior and that such predictions are arbitrary).
201. Id. at 255.
202. Martin v. Strasburg, 689 F.2d 365, 367 (2d Cir. 1982), rev’d sub nom.
Schall, 467 U.S. at 253.
203. Id. at 373–74.
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C. THE IMPORTANCE OF DUE PROCESS SAFEGUARDS
OUTWEIGHS EFFICIENCY CONCERNS
Opponents of granting juveniles more due process safeguards cite efficiency concerns. Specifically, they argue that
additional due process safeguards would result in a backlog of
hearings and impede the functionality of the juvenile court.204
On the contrary, experience demonstrates that allowing juveniles the right to a jury has not seriously halted the juvenile
justice system.205 Similarly, providing juveniles with an additional hearing which allows them a meaningful opportunity to
contest pretrial detention will not impede the functioning of the
system.206
In fact, providing juveniles with additional safeguards,
such as jury trials, aids the rehabilitative aims of the juvenile
court.207 Offering a disgruntled minor a chance to have his or
her case heard before an objective jury may help rebuke the notion that the system treated the individual unfairly.208 A jury
trial can help instill a sense of responsibility and self-esteem in
a juvenile.209 Correspondingly, a hearing prior to pretrial detention and other procedural safeguards may help the juvenile
believe the system operates fairly and with a sense of justice.
Efficiency concerns must not supersede the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Juveniles deserve fair
judicial hearings on the matter of pretrial detention. Without
an adequate and meaningful opportunity to dispute pretrial detention, juveniles will be separated from their communities and
face undue stigmatization. Their constitutional right to be free
from bodily restraint210 should not be diminished.

204. PRESTON ELROD & R. SCOTT RYDER, JUVENILE JUSTICE: A SOCIAL,
HISTORICAL, AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVE 126 (3d ed. 2011).
205. Id.
206. Cf. id. (arguing that trials would not impede the functioning of the
court).
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1,
18 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Liberty from
bodily restraint always has been recognized as the core of the liberty protected
by the Due Process Clause from arbitrary governmental action.”).
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III. TOWARD THE RECOGNITION OF A NEW
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT: ENSURING FUNDAMENTAL
FAIRNESS FOR JUVENILES
The judiciary has the power to end the lack of procedural
safeguards available to juveniles at the pretrial detention
stage. The United States Supreme Court must recognize, as the
Kansas Supreme Court boldly did, that the nature of the juvenile justice system has changed drastically.211 New legislation
and court decisions have moved the system away from its once
rehabilitative foundation.212 The fundamental alteration of the
system demands that courts take a second look at the due process safeguards provided for juveniles.213 In a system that favors punitive measures to punish the so-called juvenile superpredators,214 the Court must step in to ensure the fundamental
fairness of the system. The Court should grant the same procedural safeguards that adults enjoy to juvenile offenders.
The recognition that physically detaining juveniles implicates a fundamental right will lead to the creation of national
guidelines and criteria for detainment. Stricter guidelines will
reduce the number of juveniles in pretrial detention. This will
alleviate the burden on state resources and foster the development of diversionary programs. Utilizing diversionary programs, rather than pretrial detention, will help the juvenile
justice system return to its rehabilitative underpinnings.
A. THE COURT SHOULD RECOGNIZE THAT JUVENILE OFFENDERS
DESERVE A PROBABLE CAUSE HEARING AND THE RIGHT TO
REASONABLE BAIL
The first step toward fixing the lack of fundamental fairness in the juvenile justice system is recognizing that juveniles,
like adults, have a fundamental right to be free from physical
restraint, not just a substantial interest.215 Justice Thurgood
Marshall proclaimed, “If the ‘liberty’ protected by the Due Pro211. See In re L.M., 186 P.3d 164, 169 (Kan. 2008) (“Sentencing of juveniles
has become much more congruent with the adult model.”).
212. See id. (describing the change in the juvenile justice system in Kansas).
213. See, e.g., id. at 168–70 (noting that, due to the change in the system,
the court was not bound by old decisions and needed to reconsider due process
for juveniles).
214. See Amy McCarthy, Punishing Juveniles: Is Life Without Parole Too
Cruel?, 15 PUB. INT. L. REP. 99, 100 (2010) (explaining that Professor John
Dilulio, Jr., of Princeton University coined the term “juvenile super-predators”
following the spike in juvenile crime).
215. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 750 (1987).
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cess Clause means anything, it means freedom from physical
restraint.”216 The essence of the Due Process Clause is ensuring
people the right to be free from physical restraint. Therefore,
the Court should recognize that a juvenile’s liberty interest
amounts to a fundamental right, not just a substantial interest.
The distinction between a fundamental right and a substantial interest is crucial. A fundamental right may only be
burdened if the government holds a compelling interest.217
Forcing the government to demonstrate that a very important
interest exists coincides with precedent relating to pretrial detention.218 For adult defendants, a state “must provide a fair
and reliable determination of probable cause as a condition for
any significant pretrial restraint of liberty, and this determination must be made by a judicial officer either before or promptly
after arrest.”219 The State must prove there is probable cause to
believe the person committed the crime charged in order to hold
him pending further proceedings.220
Considering the severity of “prolonged detention,” the
Court has forbidden pretrial incarceration for adults without a
probable cause determination.221 Likewise, the Court recognized that if the government wishes to set bail for adults “at a
figure higher than an amount reasonably calculated to” ensure
the defendant attends court dates, then a hearing must be held
to ensure the amount does not violate the defendant’s Eighth
Amendment rights.222
Courts are already paving the way toward more procedural
safeguards for pretrial detention of juveniles. For example, a
court in Louisiana held that providing bail to juveniles prior to
trial was necessary to comport with the fundamental fairness
standard outlined in Gault.223 It based its decision on the prem216. Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 288 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
217. Id.
218. See id. (discussing the fundamental liberty interest implicated by detention); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 113–14 (1975) (holding that, due to
the fundamental liberty interest inherent in the Fourth Amendment, probable
cause is required before prolonged detention); Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4 –5
(1951) (connecting the right to liberty with the concept of bail).
219. Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 125.
220. See id. at 120 (discussing the difference between probable cause and
the state’s burden of proof ).
221. Id. at 113–14.
222. Stack, 342 U.S. at 4 –5.
223. FELD, supra note 25, at 425 (citing State in Interest of Banks, 402 So.
2d 690 (La. 1981)).
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ise that the presumption of innocence may only be preserved if
the court grants juveniles the right to bail.224 Most state courts,
however, conclude that denial of the right to bail to juveniles is
permissible because pretrial detention statutes provide an “adequate substitute.”225
In adult criminal court, many judicial decisions are based
on predicative factors, such as potential for future dangerousness.226 Yet, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment effectively constrains judicial decision making in
adult cases.227 The Court recognizes that adults have a “strong
liberty interest” in being free from physical restraint.228 A criminal defendant’s “strong liberty interest” may only be subordinated to the “greater needs of society” if “the government’s interest is sufficiently weighty.”229 Compare this to the Court’s
recognition that a juvenile has a “substantial” interest to be
free from physical restraint which may be overcome simply by
the government’s “legitimate interest.”230
A comparison of the similarities in the sentencing guidelines for adults and juveniles sheds light on the situation.231
For example, in Kansas, adults and juveniles face a myriad of
similar consequences.232 Adults and juveniles may be sentenced
to probation, community-based programs, house arrest, incarceration in an institution, drug and alcohol assessments, and
224. Id.
225. See id. (noting the tendency of the juvenile statutory regime to not offer bail for juveniles). Some courts have held that juvenile-detention statutes
provide an adequate substitute to bail when they faithfully follow the following principles outlined by Congress:
(1) the child shall receive such care and guidance, preferably in his
own home, as will serve his welfare and the best interests of the District; and (2) the child’s family ties shall be conserved and strengthened whenever possible, and, except when his welfare or the safety
and protection of the public cannot be adequately safeguarded without his removal, he may not be removed from the custody of his parent; and (3) when the child is removed from his own family, the court
shall secure for him custody, care, and discipline as nearly as possible
equivalent to that which should have been given him by his parents.
Fulwood v. Stone, 394 F.2d 939, 943 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (quoting D.C. Code § 162316).
226. Moriearty, supra note 71, at 303–04.
227. Id.
228. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 750–51 (1987).
229. Id.
230. Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 264 –66 (1984).
231. See In re L.M., 186 P.3d 164, 168–70 (Kan. 2008).
232. Id.
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counseling.233 Courts may also impose fines, restitution, and
community service for juvenile and adult offenders.234 Juvenile
offenders face many of same penalties adults do in the judicial
system,235 yet juveniles lack most of the Due Process safeguards adults receive.
Unlike adults, in most states, juvenile offenders do not
have the right to bail.236 The Court has interpreted the Eighth
Amendment to grant the right to reasonable bail for adults.237
Many argue that juveniles do not need the constitutional right
to reasonable bail because statutes authorize judges to release
children to the custody of their parents.238 Nonetheless, this argument fails to address the reality that judges retain the discretion to refuse to release juveniles to their parents and instead place juveniles in pretrial detention.239 Given the
punitive nature of the juvenile system, courts should, at a minimum, grant children the same procedural safeguards that
adults
enjoy.
B. THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD IMPLEMENT A CLEAR AND
CONVINCING EVIDENCE STANDARD IN JUVENILE PRETRIAL
DETENTION HEARINGS
Once the Court recognizes that juvenile offenders have a
fundamental right to contest their pretrial detention, it should
implement a heightened evidentiary standard. Logic demands,
given the fundamental nature of the right at stake, that the
Court institute a clear and convincing evidence standard in
these proceedings.
The Bail Reform Act ensures a number of procedural safeguards are available to adults:
The judicial officer charged with the responsibility of determining the
appropriateness of detention is guided by statutorily enumerated factors, which include the nature and the circumstances of the charges,
the weight of the evidence, the history and characteristics of the putative offender, and the danger to the community. The Government
must prove its case by clear and convincing evidence. Finally, the judicial officer must include written findings of fact and a written state233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Moriearty, supra note 71, at 304.
SIEGEL & WELSH, supra note 82, at 501.
Id.
See id.
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ment of reasons for a decision to detain. The Act’s review provisions,
provide for immediate appellate review of the detention decision.240

Under the Bail Reform Act of 1984, prosecutors must establish “‘by clear and convincing evidence’ that the defendant
will fail to return to court, obstruct justice, or intimidate a witness or juror, and that there are no conditions of release which
would reasonably ensure the public’s safety.”241 The clear and
convincing evidence burden of proof should rest on the prosecution when confining juveniles to pretrial detention as well.242
The heightened burden of proof creates an “adversarial and
formal” hearing process,243 which would protect a juvenile’s
fundamental right to be free from physical restraint.
C. SUPREME COURT RECOGNITION OF A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT
WILL FACILITATE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A NATIONAL
STANDARD
Historically, the judiciary has granted juveniles a number
of Due Process safeguards, as explained in detail in Part I.A of
this Note. Unlike state legislatures, the Supreme Court is insulated from political pressure surrounding the spike in juvenile
crime. The courts have always been responsible for protecting
the rights of minorities because of their unique position in the
political system. This insulation from political pressure makes
the courts well-suited to start recognizing that juveniles have a
fundamental right to be free from physical restraint.
Once the Court recognizes that vague and overly broad
pretrial detention statutes violate a juvenile’s constitutional
right to be free from physical restraint, the legislature will be
forced to amend those laws. Legislatures will have to provide
clear criteria to guide judicial decision making. The revisions to
these statutes should mirror those present in the adult pretrial
detention statutes. Additionally, these criteria should reflect
the detrimental sociological consequences juveniles face when
detained.
The Juvenile Detention Alternatives Initiative (JDAI) offers states a model to reduce the number of juveniles detained,
reduce the financial burden on taxpayers, promote public safe240. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 751–52 (1987) (citations
omitted).
241. Moriearty, supra note 71, at 304 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e) (2006)).
242. See id. at 304 –05 (discussing the stark difference in prosecutorial
burden between the adult and juvenile contexts).
243. Id. at 304.
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ty, and reduce racial disparities.244 JDAI encourages the adoption of plans that focus on alternatives to detaining youth.245
Currently, jurisdictions in twenty-seven states utilize the JDAI
model, encompassing seventeen percent of the nation’s juvenile
population.246 While the number of states that use JDAI is
growing, the Supreme Court’s recognition of a fundamental
right would provide a uniform national standard and ensure all
juveniles have procedural safeguards.
The judiciary has the responsibility to recognize that juveniles have a fundamental, constitutional right to contest pretrial detention. Stricter criteria in statutes coupled with the
recognition of a fundamental right will reduce the number of
juveniles in detention facilities.
D. STATES SHOULD ENCOURAGE THE USE OF DIVERSIONARY
PROGRAMS AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO PRETRIAL DETENTION
In order to return to the rehabilitative roots of the juvenile
justice system, states should utilize diversionary programs as
an alternative to pretrial detention. First and foremost, judges
should strongly consider returning juveniles to the care of a
guardian. When that is not practicable, judges should place juveniles in diversionary programs and connect them with community-based resources. As a last resort, judges can consider
pretrial detention in an institutional facility.
Diversionary programs frequently exist at the sentencing
stage, but community-based resources should be utilized as
soon as a juvenile is detained for the first time. A program in
San Francisco called Detention Diversion Advocacy Program
(DDAP) focuses its energy on connecting repeat offenders with
services to reduce recidivism rates.247 This type of program is
referred to as a “wraparound” approach.248 Wraparound programs develop a “complex, multifaceted intervention strategy”
aimed at keeping youth out of institutions and at home.249

244. THE ANNIE E. CASEY FOUND., supra note 97, at 14 –25.
245. Id. at 8–10.
246. Id. at 10.
247. Detention Diversion Advocacy Program, CENTER JUV. & CRIM. JUST.,
http://www.cjcj.org/detention_diversion_advocacy_program ( last visited May
25, 2012).
248. Wraparound/Case Management, OFFICE JUV. JUST. & DELINQ. PREVENTION, http://www.ojjdp.gov/mpg/progTypesCaseManagementInt.aspx ( last
visited May 25, 2012).
249. Id.
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Wraparound programs offer juveniles a plethora of communitybased support networks and individualized services.250
The screening process for wraparound programs should occur in place of juvenile pretrial detention. If a judge decides to
place a juvenile in a diversionary program, then qualified case
managers, in conjunction with the youth’s family, will create a
case plan. Wraparound programs assess the mental health,
physical health, academic, and social needs of youth.251 Since
this screening would begin prior to the adjudication of guilt,
these programs would not focus on the guilt or innocence of the
juvenile. Instead, the programs would take into account the
needs of the youth and work with them accordingly.
Opponents of using these rehabilitative programs may argue that they are too costly. Conversely, there are simple ways
to defray the costs associated with these programs. If courts reduced their reliance on pretrial detention, then the costs associated with detaining a juvenile would decrease. Since wraparound programs often address health issues, Medicaid is often
used to cover the costs.252 Programs could also request a contribution from the juvenile’s parents, provided they are not indigent. Additionally, policymakers advocate for investing in rehabilitative programs for juveniles to avoid paying to prosecute
and incarcerate these individuals in their adult lives.253
CONCLUSION
The shift away from the rehabilitative roots and focus on
the doctrine of parens patriae fundamentally altered the nature
of the juvenile justice system. The increasingly punitive juvenile justice system warrants a second look at due process safeguards afforded to juvenile delinquents. The Supreme Court
should recognize that juveniles facing pretrial detention currently do not have a meaningful opportunity to contest it. The
Court should recognize that pretrial detention is starkly different from parental custody. Overly broad statutes grant judges
vast discretion over the outcome. Juveniles should have a fundamental right, not just a substantial interest, to be free from
physical restraint. At a minimum, juveniles should enjoy the
250. Id.
251. See id.
252. Id.
253. Detention Diversion Advocacy Program, supra note 247 (discussing
evaluations of a rehabilitation program and the program’s ability to stop juveniles from re-offending as they age).
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same Due Process protections present in the adult criminal system. Court recognition of a juvenile’s fundamental right to be
free from bodily restraint would resolve the lack of fairness in
the punitive juvenile justice system.

